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On	18	February	2010,	 the	military	 in	Niger,	 led	by	Major	
















The	 coup	 in	 Niger	 follows	 a	 series	 of	 coups	 and	















On	 10	 March	 2009,	 the	 mayor	 of	 Antananarivo,	
Andry	 rajoelina,	 led	 the	 unconstitutional	 change	 of	
the	 government	 of	 President	 Marc	 ravalomanana.	
ravalomanana	 was	 f irst	 elected	 as	 the	 mayor	 of	
Madagascar’s	capital,	Antananarivo,	and	was	then	declared	
the	winner	of	the	first	round	of	a	2001	presidential	election.	




These	 coups	 and	 unconstitutional	 changes	 of	
government	 mark	 a	 disturbing	 trend	 in	 Africa.	 It	 takes	




The	 1990s	 saw	 a	 decline	 in	 the	 number	 of	 coups	 in	







Given	 the	 history	 of	 coups	 and	 unconstitutional	
changes	 of	 governments	 in	 the	 1960s	 and	 1970s,	 the	
founding	fathers	of	the	African	union	decided	to	address	
this	 issue	 by	 enshrining,	 as	 one	 of	 the	 principles	 of	
the	 African	 union,	 the	 “condemnation	 and	 rejection	 of	
















benefits	 accrue	equitably	 to	 the	nation	as	a	whole,	 this	
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and	 cooperation,	 fail	 to	 get	 off	 the	 ground	 because	 of	
bureaucratic	wrangling,	 infighting	and	preoccupations	
























































































Peacekeeping	 is	 also	 a	 dominant	 concern	 for	 the	















Brahimi	report	warned	 the	uN	not	 to	undertake.3	 It	 is	
thus	a	huge	relief	to	the	uN	that	the	Au	is	willing	to	step	
into	this	gap.	However,	the	Au	is	unable	to	sustain	these	
operations,	 because	 it	 does	 not	 yet	 have	 predictable	
funding	mechanisms,	and	 it	has	not	yet	developed	 the	
in-house	 mission-support	 capacity	 to	 backstop	 these	




to	 a	 predictable	 funding	 arrangement,	 the	 assessed-
contribution	system	to	which	every	of	 the	192	member	
states	 of	 the	 uN	 contribute,	 in	 proportion	 to	 their	
gross	 domestic	 product	 (GDP).	 This	 financing	 system	
has	 proven	 to	 be	 the	 uN’s	 single	 largest	 comparative	
advantage.	The	uN	has	also	developed	a	unique	capacity	
to	 plan,	 sustain	 and	 drawdown	 large	 peacekeeping	
missions,	 of ten	 in	 some	 of	 the	 most	 remote	 parts	 of	
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Ugandan	soldiers	from	the	African	Union	ride	in	a	convoy	of	armoured	personnel	carriers,	protecting	UN	officials	during	
a	tour	of	camps	for	internally	displaced	people	on	the	outskirts	of	Mogadishu,	the	Somali	capital.
now	 housed	 in	 its	 own	 dedicated	 department	 –	 the	




It	 is	 thus	not	surprising	 that	a	 trend	has	developed	
where	 Au	 peace	 operations	 first	 stabilise	 a	 conflict,	
whereafter	the	uN	deploys	a	peacekeeping	mission	that	
takes	 on	 the	 longer-term	 responsibility	 for	 overseeing	
post-conflict	peacebuilding.	This	pattern	was	established	
in	 Burundi,	 where	 the	 Au	 deployed	 AMIB	 in	 2003,	
followed	 by	 a	 uN	 operation	 (ONuB)	 in	 2004;	 and	 was	
repeated	in	Liberia,	where	the	economic	Community	of	
West	African	states	(eCOWAs)	deployed	eCOMIL	in	2003,	
followed	by	a	uN	operation	 (uNMIL)	 later	 in	 the	same	




too	 unstable	 for	 a	 uN	 operation	 to	 take	 over	 the	 Au	




package.	 In	somalia,	 the	uN	 is	supporting	a	dedicated	
trust	 fund	 and	 a	 specialised	 support	 mission,	 the	 uN	
support	Office	for	AMIsOM	(uNsOA).4	Here	we	see	the	
uN	 deploying	 a	 mission	 dedicated	 to	 supporting	 the	
Au,	 using	 its	 comparative	 advantages	 to	 fill	 the	 gaps	






These	 innovations	 in	 the	way	 that	 the	uN	supports	
Au	peacekeeping	reflect	major	shifts	in	global	security	
partnerships,	as	well	as	significant	developments	in	uN	
peacekeeping	 reform.	 uN	 peacekeeping	 has	 radically	
transformed	itself	since	its	dramatic	failures	in	somalia,	

























6 I conflict trends




















As	 the	 scope	 of	 uN	 peacekeeping	 has	 expanded,	
so	 has	 its	 challenges.	 some	 uN	 missions,	 like	 that	 in	
Kashmir,	 have	 been	 operational	 for	 some	 60	 years,	
and	 are	 small	 and	 relatively	 stable.	 Others,	 like	 the	
Au/uN	 hybrid	 mission	 in	 Darfur	 (uNAMID),	 southern	
sudan	(uNMIs)	and	the	Congo	(MONuC),	are	large	and	
dangerous.	 In	2008,	136	uN	peacekeepers	died.	As	 the	
uN	 noted	 in	 a	 recent	 assessment,	 uN	 peacekeeping	
is	 stretched	 like	 never	 before	 and	 is	 increasingly	
called	 upon	 to	 deploy	 to	 remote,	 uncertain	 operating	
environments	and	into	volatile	political	contexts.6	There	
has	 been	 criticism	 that	 the	 security	 Council	 has	 been	
too	quick	 to	 launch	new	missions,	without	adequately	
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more	 and	 larger	 peace	 operations	 against	 the	 global	




states	 (us)	 President	 Barack	 Obama	 has	 pledged	 to	
transform	 the	 Bush	 administration’s	 poor	 relationship	
with	the	uN,	and	to	increase	his	administration’s	support	
for	uN	peacekeeping.	The	us,	europe	and	Japan	together	
are	 responsible	 for	 approximately	 88%	 of	 the	 uN’s	
annual	 peacekeeping	 budget.	 In	 August	 2009,	 susan	
rice,	Washington’s	ambassador	 to	 the	uN,	announced	
that,	 despite	 the	 global	 financial	 crisis,	 the	 us	 is	 now	
in	a	position	 to	 clear	 all	 its	peacekeeping	arrears,	 and	
hand	over	us$2.2	billion	in	new	and	old	contributions	to	
the	uN.	
In	 an	 assessment	 system	 based	 on	 GDP,	 the	 us	 is	
responsible	 for	26%	of	 the	uN’s	peacekeeping	budget,	





us$ 3.5	 billion	 a	 month. 8	 Ambassador	 rice	 pointed	
out	 that,	 for	every	dollar	 it	 costs	 the	us	 to	carry	out	a	
peacekeeping	 activity	 independently,	 it	 costs	 just	 12	
cents	to	carry	out	the	same	task	as	part	of	a	uN	mission.	
Another	 estimate	 indicates	 that	 the	 per	 capita	 cost	
of	a	NATO	mission	 is	 five	 times	 that	of	a	uN	mission.9	
Whilst	 the	cost	of	uN	and	Au	peace	operations	 is	 thus	
not	 insignif icant,	 they	 are	 ef f icient	 and	 convenient	






INDePeNDeNTLy,	 IT	 COsTs	 JusT	 12	
CeNTs	TO	CArry	OuT	THe	sAMe	TAsK	
As	 PArT	 OF	 A	 uN	 MIssION.	 ANOTHer	
esTIMATe	 INDICATes	 THAT	 THe	 Per	
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cheaper	 than	 if	 they	 were	 drawn	 into	 these	 conflict-
management	 tasks	 themselves.	 This	 also	 explains,	
in	 part,	 why	 China	 is	 now	 the	 largest	 contributor	 of	
peacekeepers	among	the	permanent	members	of	the	uN	
security	Council.	
The	 us	 and	 europe	 are	 also	 major	 f inancial	
c o n t r i b u t o r s 	 t o 	 Au 	 p e a c e 	 o p e r a t i o n s . 	 T h e	
Au ’s 	 f i r s t 	 su c h	 op er a t ion , 	 A MIB	 in 	 Burund i ,	
h a d 	 a n 	 a p p r o v e d 	 s t r e n g t h 	 o f 	 j u s t 	 o v e r	
3	000	troops	and	an	operational	budget	of	approximately	
us $13 0	 mi l l ion	 p er 	 year. 	 In 	 c ompar ison, 	 the	





cost	 to	 the	south	African	 tax	payer	was	approximately	
us$110	million.	The	eu	contributed	approximately	€45	
million	 to	 the	 Au,	 whilst	 the	 united	 Kingdom	 and	 the	
us	 contributed	 another	 approximately	 us$20	 million	
directly	 to	 ethiopia	 and	 Mozambique,	 to	 enable	 them	
to	participate	in	AMIB.	south	Africa	was	willing	to	take	
on	 the	 lead-nation	 role	 –	 including	 its	 financial	 cost	 –	





















sOuTH	 AFrICA	 WAs	 WILLING	 TO	 TAKe	 ON	 THe	 LeAD-NATION	 rOLe	 –	 INCLuDING	
ITs	FINANCIAL	COsT	–	 IN	BuruNDI	BeCAuse	 IT	LeD	THe	MeDIATION	eFFOrT	THAT	
resuLTeD	 IN	 THe	 PeACe	 PrOCess,	 AND	 IT	 WAs	 THus	 A	 MATTer	 OF	 NATIONAL	
INTeresT	 TO	 eNsure	 THAT	 THe	 PeACe	 PrOCess	 WAs	 suPPOrTeD	 WITH	 AN	
AFrICAN	PeACe	OPerATION
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voluntary	 contributions,	 mostly	 from	 the	 eu	 and	 the	






its	own	mission	support,	 financial	contributors	 like	 the	





it	 extremely	 difficult	 to	 plan	 properly	 and	 sustain	 the	
mission.	The	uN’s	support	packages,	mentioned	earlier,	
were	 thus	 a	 welcome	 relief	 and	 a	 highly	 meaningful	
contribution.
AMIsOM	in	somalia,	the	Au’s	third	large-scale	peace	
operation,	 with	 approximately	 8	 000	 military,	 police	
and	 civilian	 peacekeepers,	 was	 first	 deployed	 in	 2007.	
AMIsOM’s	 cost	 has	 increased	 proportionally	 with	 the	
number	of	soldiers,	from	an	initial	approximately	us$250	
million	 per	 year	 to	 now	 close	 to	 us$500	 million.	 The	
us	 and	 europe	 have	 again	 contributed	 the	 bulk	 of	 the	
costs	for	AMIsOM	and,	as	mentioned	earlier,	the	uN	has	
now	deployed	a	dedicated	support	mission	to	AMIsOM	





of	 African	 military	 and	 police	 contributions,	 Au	 and	
voluntary	contributions	to	the	Au	Peace	Fund	and	support	
from	 the	 uN.	 This	 is	 problematic,	 but	 unavoidable,	
because	 the	 Au’s	 dependency	 on	 external	 resources	
denies	 it	 the	 independent	 freedom	 to	 make	 decisions	
on	some	of	 the	strategic,	operational	and	even	tactical	
aspects	of	the	peace	operations	it	may	wish	to	undertake.	




A	 joint	 uN	 and	 Au	 panel	 was	 established	 to	
consider	 the	 modalities	 for	 supporting	 and	 financing	
Au	 peacekeeping	 operations.	 The	 panel	 was	 chaired	
by	 the	 former	 Italian	 prime	 minister,	 romano	 Prodi,	
and	 it	 submitted	 its	 report	 to	 the	 Au	 and	 uN	 on	 31	
December	 2008.	 The	 panel	 recommended	 a	 number	
of	 concrete	 steps	 that	 could	 be	 taken	 to	 strengthen	
the	 relationship	 between	 the	 uN	 and	 the	 Au,	 but	 the	
central	 recommendation	 of	 the	 panel	 was	 the	 use	 of	







system	 to	 support	 uN-authorised	 Au	 peacekeeping	
missions	 is	 now	 openly	 discussed	 as	 one	 option	 on	
the	 table.	 However,	 in	 reality,	 the	 panel’s	 suggestion	
goes	no	 further	 than	what	 the	uN	has	already	done	 in	
Darfur	and	somalia	with	 the	support	packages	and	the	
support	office.	In	fact,	the	uN	has	already	gone	further	








However,	 financial	 considerations	 are	 not	 the	 only	
aspects	 of	 Au/uN	 cooperation.	 There	 is	 room	 for	
enhanced	cooperation	on	the	political	front	between	the	
Au’s	 Peace	 and	 security	 Council	 and	 the	 uN	 security	
Council,	and	scope	for	further	cooperation	between	the	






and	 NATO	 in	 Iraq	 and	 Afghanistan,	 have	 resulted	 in	
the	 widely	 recognised	 understanding	 that	 the	 uN	
failures	 in	 the	1990s	were	not	because	 the	uN	system	





and	 that	 the	world	needed	more	 robust	peacekeeping.	
Ten	 years	 later,	 the	 us	 and	 NATO,	 and	 the	 world	 with	
A	 JOINT	 uN	 AND	 Au	 PANeL	 WAs	 esTABLIsHeD	 TO	 CONsIDer	 THe	 MODALITIes	
FOr	 suPPOrTING	 AND	 FINANCING	 Au	 PeACeKeePING	 OPerATIONs.	 THe	 PANeL	
WAs	CHAIreD	By	THe	FOrMer	 ITALIAN	PrIMe	MINIsTer,	rOMANO	 PrODI,	AND	 IT	
suBMITTeD	ITs	rePOrT	TO	THe	Au	AND	uN	ON	31	DeCeMBer	2008
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them,	 have	 rediscovered	 in	 Iraq	 and	 Afghanistan	 that	
complex	 conflicts	 are	 not	 resolved	 by	 force	 alone,	 no	





are	 credibili ty	 and	 legitimacy.	 This	 is	 the	 critical	
ingredient	 that	 the	 us	 and	 NATO	 lack	 in	 Iraq	 and	
Afghanistan,	 and	 the	 reason	 why	 the	 uN	 has	 proved	
indispensable	 in	 Kosovo,	 Lebanon	 and	 Darfur.	 The	
enduring	 lesson	 is	 that,	 in	 peacemaking,	 credibility	







at	 Canada’s	 simon	 Fraser	 university	 found	 that	 there	






especially	 women	 and	 children	 –	 are	 still	 alarming.	
However,	the	study	credits	“interventions	by	the	united	
Nations,	plus	 the	end	of	colonialism	and	the	Cold	War,	

























































































In	a	bid	 to	actualise	 the	Niger	Delta	Peace	Plan,	 in	April	
2009	the	Nigerian	President	offered	amnesty	to	militants	




and	 not	 about	 making	 it	 easier	 to	 live	 with.	 The	 Niger	
Delta	 problem,	 like	 many	 other	 conflicts	 in	 developing	
countries,	has	its	roots	in	protracted	and	intergenerational	
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dispute.	 It	 is	about	 fundamentum	omnius cultus animae	
(“the	soul	of	all	 improvement	 is	 the	 improvement	of	 the	
soul”).	One	best-practice	model	 to	deal	with	 this	kind	of	
problem	is	the	application	of	the	psychology	of	cognitive	
behaviour	 reversal	 training	 (CBrT),	 aimed	 at	 providing	
fundamental	 trainings	 on	 alternative	 dispute	 resolution,	




This	 article	 argues	 for	 a	 constructive	 community	
mentoring	 and	 peace	 education	 model	 for	 ex-militants	




peace	 project	 needs	 to	 hold	 peace	 and	 community	
reintegration	 action	 workshops,	 in	 the	 process	 training,	
organising	 and	 mobilising	 both	 community	 leaders	 and	












and	 confidence,	 so	 as	 to	 develop	 their	 potential	 and	
overcome	barriers	to	community	peace	and	reintegration.	
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in	peace	projects	 in	divided	communities.	 It	 should	aim	
at	developing	a	national	mentoring	profile,	 and	become	
an	 example	 of	 evidence-based	 practice	 of	 community	






to	 qualified	 militants	 in	 the	 paramilitary	 services,	 this	
should	 not,	 however,	 undermine	 the	 long-term	 benefits	
of	developmental	reintegration.	In	recent	years,	literature2	
on	 the	 reintegration	 of	 ex-combatants	 has	 warned	 that	
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eVeN	 WHeN	 THe	 DeMOBILIseD	
COMBATANTs	 Are	 NOT	 FAKe,	
THe	 AFGHAN	 CAse	 sHOWs	 THAT	
ex-COMBATANTs	 WHO	 HAD	 OPeNeD	
sMALL-sCALe	 BusINesses	 WITH	 THe	
suPPOrT	 reCeIVeD	 FrOM	 AN	 ArMs-
FOr-CAsH	 PrOJeCT	 HAD	 THeN	 seNT	
THeIr	yOuNGer	BrOTHers	OFF	TO	JOIN	
COMBAT	 FOrCes,	 THereBy	 CreATING	
THe	 IMPressION	 THAT	 VIOLeNCe	 AND	
MILITANCy	CAN	Be	reWArDING
trap”	 –	 that	 is,	 new	 forms	 of	 conflict	 that	 are	 violent,	
exploitative	and	illiberal,	and	will	not	necessarily	culminate	
in	 revived	 democratic	 institutions.	 somalia	 is	 a	 good	
example	of	this	“evolution	of	the	conflict	trap”3	because,	
with	about	60	000	ex-somali	combatants	working	as	private	
security	 guards	 in	 Mogadishu,	 reintegration	 looks	 more	









in	 community	 reintegration	 training	and	activities.	They	
later	went	on	to	organise	local	shura	(councils)	of	women	
concerned	 with	 local	 peacebuilding	 and	 community	
cohesion	 (rossi	 and	 Giustazzi,	 2006).	 The	 success	 of	














in	the	country,	 it	 is	usually	not	difficult	 for	unscrupulous	









a	 significant	 impact	 on	 others	 who	 might	 wish	 to	 incite	
violence	in	their	communities	in	future.
Objectives	of	a	Good	Peace	Mentoring	Project	
•	 To	 identify	 and	 provide	 knowledge	 to	 participating	
ex-militants	on	how	to	access	local	resources	(medical,	
psychological	and	economic)	and	alternative	pathways	











leaders	 to	 reject	 small	 arms	 and	 light	 weapons	
proliferation	(sALWP)	in	their	communities.
•	 To	 persuade	 ex-militants	 in	 the	 PMP	 to	 feature	 on	
television,	as	transformed	and	productive	members	of	
the	community.
•	 To	 identify	 successful	 ex-militants	 for	 deployment	
as	 inspirational	 guest	 speakers	 on	 the	 principles	 of	
ecumenism,	victim	empathy	and	non-violence	at	youth	











are	not	 fake,	 the	Afghan	case	shows	 that	ex-combatants	
who	had	opened	small-scale	businesses	with	the	support	






requires	 a	 strong	 commitment	 from	 government	
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institutions	 and	 the	 active	 participation	 of	 NGOs,	 the	
private	sector	and	receiving	communities,	a	reintegration	
project	should	aim	at	both	short-	and	 long-term	working	
relationships	 with	 industrial	 training	 funds,	 directorates	
of	 employment	 and	 talent-hunt	 organisations,	 among	
others.	 Project	 implementation	 activities	 could	 be	 of	
two	types:	quick	 impact	and	stopgap.	The	former	should	




Economic and Vocational Training: 
This	 could	 be	 in	 the	 form	 of	 intensive	 workshops	
dedicated	 to	 identifying	 and	 assessing	 viable	 economic	
opportunities,	vocational	training	resources	and	pathways	






and	 Giustazzi6	 show	 that	 World	 Vision	 (an	 international	





Thus,	 World	 Vision	 offered	 training	 mainly	 in	 skills	






car	 engines	 from	 soviet	 times.	 In	 other	 cases,	 several	
ex-combatants	who	came	from	the	same	villages	(and	same	








of	 the	 Afghan	 projects,	 it	 should	 be	 clear	 that	 adequate	
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In	the	Niger	Delta	reintegration	Project,	for	instance,	it	is	
imperative	for	project	designers	and	facilitators	to	note	that	
the	 multimillion-dollar	 contracts	 for	 the	 dredging	 of	 the	
inland	water	ways	of	the	lower	Niger,	for	road	constructions	
in	 the	 Niger	 Delta,	 and	 for	 the	 Brass-Nembe	 Liquidified	
Natural	 Gas	 (LNG)	 project,	 present	 potential	 economic	
and	 employment	 opportunities	 for	 the	 rehabilitation	
and	 reintegration	 of	 ex-combatants.	 The	 Niger	 Delta	
reintegration	Project	Committee	should	guide	ex-militants	
to	position	themselves	strategically	for	these	opportunities,	






on	 skills	 training	 that	 will	 position	 them	 strategically	 to	
benefit	from	the	dividends	of	those	industries	and	services.	
Health and Psychological Screening:
Another	quick-impact	activity	that	should	be	provided	
is	health	and	psychological	screening.	 In	 the	Niger	Delta	
reintegration	 Project,	 for	 instance,	 there	 should	 be	
collaboration	with	the	National	Agency	for	the	Control	of	
AIDs	 (NACA)	 and	 the	 respective	 state	 health	 ministries.	
Quick-impact	 confidential	 and	 voluntary	 drug,	 sexually	
transmitted	infections	and	HIV	screening	services	should	
be	 provided	 for	 participating	 ex-militias.	 To	 facilitate	
their	developing	of	 strong	social	 roots	and	a	 stable	and	
sustainable	 reintegration,	 they	 must	 then	 be	 cleared	 of	
these	ailments	so	as	to	live	normal	lives.
Tenancy and Housing Supports:
Although	most	 reintegration	projects	do	not	provide	
housing	and	 resettlement	opportunities	 to	ex-militias,	 it	























In	 collaboration	 with	 the	 religious	 leaders	 of	 host	
communities,	 participating	 ex-combatants	 should	 be	
encouraged	 to	 attend	 ecumenical	 services	 to	 seek	
forgiveness	for	such	deeds	as	hostage-taking,	kidnapping,	
















reintegration	 is	 a	 process.	 It	 is,	 therefore,	 important	
that	 there	 be	 ongoing	 activities	 to	 support	 militants	
from	backsliding	during	 the	 reintegration	process.	These	
activities	should	aim	at	preventing	the	fragile	post-conflict	
communities	 from	 further	deterioration	by	 the	 long-term	
building	of	indigenous	capacity	for	continued	public	and	civic	
peace	education.	Proposed	activities	would	include:	
A Standing Peace Mentoring Project: 	
At	 the	 completion	 of	 quick-impact	 workshops,	
































18 I conflict trends
entrench	 the	 principles	 of	 ecumenism,	 victimology	 and	
restorative	justice	in	the	communities.	This	should	aim	at	
inculcating	the	sense	of	prudentialism,	victim	empathy	and	










An Annual Peace Walk:
For	sustainability	of	the	sPMP,	there	should	be	an	annual	
peace	walk	–	preferably	at	Christmas	or	any	religious	season	




or	 religious	 service	 to	 seek	 God’s	 intervention	 in	 the	
peace	process.
A Drop-in or Call Centre:
Often,	at	 the	end	of	projects,	participants	 lose	contact	
with	project	facilitators.	This	could	be	traumatising	to	some	
ex-participants	 who	 might	 need	 further	 queries.	 For	 this	
reason,	there	should	be	a	drop-in	or	call	centre	to	attend	to	
enquiries	from	project	participants	after	the	projects	have	
ended.	 The	 centre	 could	 do	 referral	 services,	 telephone	
follow-ups	and	ongoing	guidance	and	counselling	arising	
from	tenancy	issues,	community	relations,	CV	preparation,	
job	 applications,	 etc.	 These	 post-project	 activities	 could	








•	 Confirmation	 of	 attendance	 of	 selected	 project	
participants.	If	the	attendance	confirmation	rate	is	low,	
project	facilitators	should	try	to	ascertain	the	reasons.	






•	 Post-workshop	 assessments	 to	 determine	 learning	
outcomes.	where	participants	 could	be	asked	 to	 list	
three	or	more	learning	outcomes	at	the	conclusion	of	
an	event,	with	consideration	to	the	learning	objectives	
identified	 earlier.	 They	 could	 also	 be	 asked	 to	 state	
how	 they	 will	 apply	 the	 outcomes	 to	 actualise	 their	
objectives,	including	such	questions	as:	what	actions	
















somalia.	Conflict, Security and Development	(4)	2,	pp.	149-165.
3		 Kingma,	K.	(2000)	Demobilization	and	reintegration	experiences	
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Many	Zimbabweans	considered	the	formation,	in	February	




























motivated	 violence	 to	 acknowledge	 their	 transgressions,	
because	 the	 national	 leadership	 regularly	 exploited	
constitutional	prerogatives	to	pardon	perpetrators.	Political	







In	 this	 article,	 I	 argue	 that	 the	 major	 deficiency	 in	
the	 contemporary	 conciliatory	 political	 milieu	 is	 the	 lack	
of	 clear	 and	 binding	 instruments	 for	 achieving	 national	
healing	and	 reconciliation.	There	 is	 also	no	symmetry	 in	
the	power	relations	among	the	constituent	political	players	
in	 the	 Inclusive	 Government.	 Individuals	 and	 interests	
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still	 arbitrarily	 control	 some	 levers	 of	 the	 state,	 and	 this	
forecloses	meaningful	national	healing.	Another	shortcoming	
is	that	national	healing	is	also	conceptualised	in	selective	
racial	 terms,	with	 the	white	community	not	 factored	 into	
the	ongoing	healing	exercise.	In	short,	the	current	national	
healing	 process	 does	 not	 promise	 a	 new	 future	 without	
impunity	for	Zimbabweans.
The	ensuing	narrative	explores	the	intersecting	politics	
of	 post-colonial	 violence,	 retribution	 and	 impunity	 in	
three	 parts.	 The	 first	 part	 analyses	 the	 key	 determinants	
for	 national	 healing	 and	 reconciliation.	 In	 the	 second,	
I	 contextualise	 violence	 in	 Zimbabwe	 by	 exploring	 the	
inadequacies	 of	 the	 country’s	 post-colonial	 attempts	 at	
national	healing.	The	third	section	is	my	critique	of	attempts	





















they	 unearth	 particular	 views	 that	 do	 not	 devalue	 the	
possibility	of	knowing	the	past,	even	as	they	open	up	“the	
category	of	historical	truth	to	its	partiality”.3
Truth-telling,	however	partial,	 is	an	 imperative	 in	any	
national	 healing	 matrix	 because	 “part	 of	 the	 process	 of	
psychological	healing	for	any	victim	of	abuse,	is	being	given	
the	opportunity	 to	 recount	 that	suffering	 to	a	supportive,	
non-judgmental	 audience”.4	 In	 many	 instances,	 victims’	






their	 national	 leadership	 has	 accorded	 premium	 to	 the	
state-sanctioned	 ideal	 of	 forgiveness	 without	 truth,	 and	
reconciliation	without	justice.






















political	 firmament.	 The	 colonial	 rhodesian	 state	 set	
















THeIr	 TrANsGressIONs,	 BeCAuse	 THe	 NATIONAL	 LeADersHIP	 reGuLArLy	
exPLOITeD	CONsTITuTIONAL	PrerOGATIVes	TO	PArDON	PerPeTrATOrs









and	 soldiers.	 Though	 internationally	 acclaimed,	 the	
reconciliation	policy	of	the	1980s	was	narrowly	conceived.	












place	 in	 the	 Midlands	 and	 Matabeleland	 provinces.	 This	
campaign,	 known	 as	 Gukurahundi,	 was	 spearheaded	 by	
the	North	Korean-trained	Fifth	Brigade.	This	outfit	did	not	
operate	under	the	normal	army	chain	of	command.	Instead,	





amnesty	 to	 the	 dissidents,	 those	 who	 had	 aided	 them,	
ZAPu	(PF)	“political	fugitives	from	justice”	and	all	members	
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divisive	 past	 conflicts.	 In	 the	 late	 1990s,	 when	 human	
rights	organisations	such	as	the	Amani	Trust,	the	Catholic	
Commission	 for	 Justice	 and	 Peace	 (CCJP),	 lawyers	 and	
some	media	elements,	called	 for	 thorough	 investigations	
into	the	Gukurahundi	massacres,	President	robert	Mugabe	















this	 statement	 has	 a	 dual	 irony.	 First,	 President	 Mugabe	
has	 never	 officially	 acknowledged	 the	 Gukurahundi	
massacres,	 other	 than	 a	 terse	 1999	 observation	 that	 “it	
was	 a	 moment	 of	 madness”.	 He	 has	 kept	 reports	 of	 the	
state-instituted	Dumbutshena	enquiry	on	 the	entumbane	
skirmishes	of	1980/81	and	the	Chihambakwe	Commission	
of	enquiry	 into	 the	Gukurahundi	 in	 state	vaults.	second,	
in	 the	post-2000	period,	President	Mugabe	and	his	 ruling	
ZANu	(PF)	party	have	“dug	up	history”	by	appropriating	
and	 instrumentalising	 memories	 of	 colonial	 suffering	
and	 violence	 to	 harass,	 exclude	 and	 violate	 ethnic	 and	
racial	 minorities	 and	 MDC	 members.	 They	 have	 accused	















































at	 executive	 level,	 together	 with	 the	 accommodative	




has	within	 it	some	 inherent	weaknesses,	and	 it	confronts	
intractable	challenges.	For	 truth	and	 justice	to	take	place,	
there	should	be	strong	moral	rejection	of	the	former	regime,	
and	 a	 clear	 consensus	 that	 its	 system	 was	 bad	 and	 its	
agents	guilty	of	moral	wrongs.	There	should	also	be	a	clear	
definition	of	what	was	wrong	with	the	past.	The	Inclusive	






At	 government	 level,	 there	 is	 also	 no	 symmetry	 in	
power	relations	among	the	political	players	in	the	Inclusive	
Government.	 In	 2008,	 Tsvangirai	 ordered	 the	 cessation	
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(PF)-aligned	 government	 functionaries	 have	 mandated	
the	 state-owned	 media	 to	 prefix	 references	 to	 Mugabe	
as	 “The	 President,	 the	 Head	 of	 state	 and	 Government	





as	 a	 patriotic	 political	 formation.	 This	 toxic	 discourse	 is	
compounded	by	ZANu	(PF)’s	claims	that	the	MDC	instigated	







These	 institutional	 deficiencies	 are	 compounded	 by	
the	fact	that	the	Organ	on	National	Healing	does	not	have	
binding	and	well	laid-out	instruments	for	achieving	national	




















for	 a	 limited	 specified	 period,	 and	 be	 empowered	 to	






supervision.	 They	 were	 independent	 bodies	 under	 the	
tutelage	of	either	respected	judges	or	priests.	This	was	the	
case	in	sierra	Leone,	Liberia	and	south	Africa.	The	south	
African	 TrC	 sought	 to	 investigate	 gross	 human	 rights	
violations	that	occurred	between	1960	and	1994,	to	create	
as	complete	an	account	as	possible	of	the	atrocities	of	the	
period.	 Perpetrators	 were	 offered	 amnesty	 in	 exchange	
for	 full	disclosures	about	 their	past	crimes.	This	was	part	
of	 a	 political	 compromise	 to	 a	 democratic	 multiracial	
dispensation	between	the	African	National	Congress	(ANC)	
and	the	outgoing	apartheid	government,	led	by	the	National	





however,	 because	 the	 major	 players	 in	 the	 Inclusive	
Government	 are	 beholden	 to	 political	 convenience	 and	
survival,	in	view	of	elections	anticipated	in	2011.	The	Organ	
on	 National	 Healing’s	 members	 are	 representatives	 and	
patrons	of	both	victims	and	victimisers.	The	two	members	
from	 the	 MDC	 formations	 might	 want	 restitution	 for	 the	
victims,	or	retribution	against	the	members	of	the	security	
forces,	war	veterans	and	militias	that	terrorised	the	people	
over	 the	 past	 decade,	 but	 the	 ZANu	 (PF)	 member	 will	
obviously	checkmate	such	retributive	moves.	ZANu	(PF)	may	
seek	reconciliation	without	a	whole	national	healing	process.	







of	 them	 today…”12	 By	 constructing	 the	 war	 veterans	 as	
“untouchables”,	the	broad	possibilities	for	national	healing,	
THese	 INsTITuTIONAL	 DeFICIeNCIes	 Are	 COMPOuNDeD	 By	 THe	 FACT	 THAT	 THe	
OrGAN	 ON	 NATIONAL	 HeALING	 DOes	 NOT	 HAVe	 BINDING	 AND	 WeLL	 LAID-OuT	
INsTruMeNTs	FOr	ACHIeVING	NATIONAL	HeALING	AND	reCONCILIATION








The	 MDC’s	 security	 Department	 had	 compiled	 and	
handed	to	the	Attorney	General	and	the	police,	a	detailed	







some	 of	 the	 MDC’s	 demands	 that	 have	 a	 bearing	 on	
national	 healing	 are	 untenable	 in	 the	 ZANu	 (PF)	 power	
matrix.	The	military	has	not	only	been	partisan	and	political,	
but	has	also	been	implicated	in	coordinating	human	rights	
violations	 against	 members	 of	 the	 MDC	 in	 the	 run-up	
to	 the	 June	 2008	 elections.	 As	 a	 result,	 the	 MDC	 wants	




could	 be	 appointed,	 in	 consultation	 with	 commanders	
of	 the	 Zimbabwe	 National	 Army	 and	 the	 Air	 Force	 of	


















such	 as	 the	 military,	 police	 and	 militias	 that	 should	 be	
investigated,	 and	 possibly	 have	 some	 of	 their	 members	
prosecuted.	 This	 view	 is	 pervasive,	 because	 violence	 in	
Zimbabwe	has	been	instigated	by	the	state.	However,	 the	
instigation	 of	 youth	 to	 intimidate	 citizens	 and	 perceived	





By	 FeBruAry	 2010	 –	 MOre	 THAN	 A	
yeAr	 AFTer	 THe	 FOrMATION	 OF	 THe	
INCLusIVe	 GOVerNMeNT	 AND	 THe	
OrGAN	 ON	 NATIONAL	 HeALING	 –	 NOT	
A	 sINGLe	 PrOseCuTION	 HAs	 TAKeN	
PLACe	 IN	 ZIMBABWe	 AGAINsT	 ANy	
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on	the	part	of	youth	has	also	been	a	significant	feature	of	












David	 Coltart,	 a	 leading	 MDC	 official	 and	 prominent	




as	 an	 acceptable	 political	 weapon	 that	 we	 have	 lost	
sight	of	the	fact	that	the	democratic	world	has	moved	
on	and	that	such	methods	are	anathema.	By	a	silent	and	
















popularly	 identified	 as	 the	 Chimurenga	 (Liberation	 War).	
Perhaps	 the	comments	of	 the	 leader	of	 the	war	veterans,	
Dr	Chenjerai	Hunzvi,	 in	early	2000,	best	approximate	 the	









In	 conclusion,	 Zimbabwe’s	 ongoing	 national	 healing	
efforts	are	a	futile	quest,	because	there	is	no	convergence	
of	 opinion	 among	 the	 political	 protagonists	 about	
defining	 and	 repudiating	 the	 ideas	 and	 individuals	 that	
fomented	 the	 violent	 politics	 of	 the	 past,	 such	 as	 youth	
militias	and	war	veterans,	who	deliberately	and	violently	
trampled	upon	 the	 rights	of	what	 they	arbitrarily	defined	
as	“unpatriotic”	citizens.	These	militias	remain	a	strategic	
reserve	 force,	 to	 be	 deployed	 at	 any	 time	 to	 checkmate	
political	 opponents	 through	 violent	 tactics.	 Added	 to	
this	 is	 the	 current	 politically	 induced	 incapacity	 of	 state	
institutions,	such	as	the	police	and	the	Attorney	General’s	
office,	to	investigate	and	prosecute	human	rights	violators.	
















4	 Catholic	Commission	for	Justice	and	Peace	(1997)	Breaking the 
Silence, Building True Peace. A Report on the Disturbances in 
Matabeleland and the Midlands	1980–1989,	p.	5.
5	 Feltoe,	Geoffrey	(2004)	The	Onslaught	Against	Democracy	and	
rule	of	Law	in	Zimbabwe	in	2000.	In	Harold-Barry,	David	(ed.)	
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7	 Ibid.
8	 Zimbabwean Government Gazette Extraordinary,	3	May	1988.


























the	 actual	 number	 of	 such	 groups	 that	 unleash	 terror	 in	
the	region,	as	a	result	of	a	constant	mutation	in	their	ranks,	




Noble	 Energy	 is	 positioned	 along	 a	 creak	 near	 Port	
Harcourt,	 Nigeria.	 A	 member	 of	 OPEC,	 Nigeria	 is	 the	
world's	 seventh	 largest	 crude	 oil	 exporter,	 and	 the	
fifth	largest	supplier	to	the	US.	The	Niger	Delta,	where	
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adversely	 affected	 oil	 production	 outputs,	 and	 Nigeria’s	












hostage-taking	 of	 both	 local	 and	 foreign	 employees	 of	
oil	 companies,	 and	 arson	 against	 vital	 oil	 installations	



















and	 reintegration	 of	 demobilised	 militants,	 including	 the	
payment	of	stipends.	The	federal	government	has	projected	
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The	process	and	actual	exploitation	of	oil	degraded	the	Niger	Delta	environment,	and	thus	alienated	the	people	from	
their	traditional	means	of	livelihood	–	farming,	fishing	and	hunting.














that	 accorded	 50%	 of	 foreign	 earnings	 to	 the	 regions	 of	


























through	 the	 expansion	 of	 public-sector	 budgets.4	 The	


















built	 on	 such	 indices	 as	 equality	 of	 states,	 population,	
land	mass	and	social	development.	These	 indices	helped	
to	 narrow	 developmental	 differences	 amongst	 states	
but	 created	 a	 development	 crisis	 in	 the	 Niger	 Delta	 as	
exemplified	by	destruction	of	the	Niger	Delta	ecosystem	and	
environmental	degradation	 from	oil	production	activities.	





the	deteriorating	quality	of	 life	 (reducing	 life	expectancy)	







The	 Niger	 Delta	 is	 a	 theatre	 of	 war	 –	 even	 though,	
officially,	war	has	not	been	declared.	But,	unofficially,	war	
rages	on	between	the	untrained,	rustic	groups	of	young	men	
whose	 knowledge	 of	 the	 creeks	 and	 their	 arteries	 makes	
them	invincible,	and	the	elitist	JTF.	The	frequent	skirmishing	
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manoeuvres	 amongst	 the	 militants	 (for	 supremacy	 and	
for	 spheres	 of	 influence),	 and	 between	 the	 militants	 and	
the	JTF,	have	had	 far-reaching	negative	economic	effects	







Delta	 militants	 has	 been	 attributed	 to	 feelings	 of	 relative	
deprivation	 arising	 from	 environmental	 degradation,	
socio-economic	 deprivation	 and	 poverty.9	 Therefore,	 the	
criminalisation	of	the	Niger	Delta	crisis	is	part	of	the	federal	
government’s	 oppressive	 strategies	 that	 have	 reinforced	
and	 entrenched	 the	 current	 violence	 in	 that	 region.10	 In	





violence	 is	 powered	 by	 such	 considerations.	 Indeed,	 the	
reference	 to	 the	development	 crisis	 in	 the	Niger	Delta	as	
the	basis	for	the	creek	war	is	only	a	decoy	–	a	smokescreen	
to	the	economic	interests	of	the	militants.	The	high-profile	







The	 intensification	 of	 criminality	 in	 the	 Niger	 Delta	
masquerading	as	freedom	fighting	is	traceable	to	the	2003	









optimism	that	 the	erection	of	 the	necessary	 infrastructure	
to	address	the	development	crisis	in	the	Niger	Delta	would	
stop	 the	 violence	 in	 that	 region.	 For	 one,	 the	 violence	 in	
the	Niger	Delta	is	not	ideologically	driven,	but	powered	by	
THe	 MNOCs	 HAVe	 LOsT	 BILLIONs	





us$21.5	 BILLION	 By	 THe	 MNOCs	 As	 A	
WHOLe	sINCe	2003
A	 team	 of	 workers	 from	 Shell	 are	 reflected	 in	 an	 oil	
















































seeks	 to	 decriminalise	 the	 activities	 of	 the	 militants	 and	
unconditionally	exonerate	them	of	culpability	in	the	myriad	
felonies	 with	 which	 they	 have	 been	 associated	 –	 namely	
illegal	 oil	 bunkering,	 arson,	 hostage-taking,	 kidnapping	






































In	 spite	 of	 the	 success	 recorded	 by	 the	 amnesty	
programme,	there	is	widespread	divergence	in	the	opinions	
of	analysts:	while	some	are	sceptical	that	the	wide	disparity	






















There	 is	 a	 sharp	division	amongst	 analysts	about	 the	
utilitarian	 value	 and	 motive	 of	 the	 amnesty	 programme	
and	 its	potential	 for	enthroning	peace.	At	 the	core	of	 this	
division	is	the	argument	about	whose	end	this	programme	
serves.	some	pessimistic	analysts	write	off	the	programme	
as	 an	 elite	 strategy	 to	 hamstring	 the	 struggle	 to	 ensure	






























in	 Iraq	 under	 the	 auspices	 of	 the	 united	 states,	 to	 enlist	
and	 co-opt	 the	Awakening	 (Sahwah)	movement	 in	Anbar	








THe	 AMNesTy	 PrOGrAMMe	 seeKs	 TO	
DeCrIMINALIse	 THe	 ACTIVITIes	 OF	 THe	
MILITANTs	 AND	 uNCONDITIONALLy	
exONerATe	 THeM	 OF	 CuLPABILITy	 IN	
THe	 MyrIAD	 FeLONIes	 WITH	 WHICH	
THey	 HAVe	 BeeN	 AssOCIATeD	 –	
NAMeLy	 ILLeGAL	 OIL	 BuNKerING,	
ArsON,	 HOsTAGe-TAKING,	 KIDNAPPING	
AND	 rANsOM	 reCeIPTs,	 KILLING	
AND	 MAIMING,	 PIPeLINe	 AND	 OIL	
INsTALLATION	 DesTruCTION	 AND	
HIGH	TreAsON
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could	be	“war	weariness”	–	the	relative	ennui	arising	from	
years	of	war	and	the	desire	to	end	it.	
There	are	 several	 challenges	 to	a	post-amnesty	Niger	







The	 second	 challenge	 is	 that	 of	 sustainability.	 How	 the	
government	is	able	to	sustain	the	tempo	of	peace,	especially	





peace.	 For	 instance,	 a	 group	 of	 400	 ex-militants	 recently	








The	 amnesty	 programme	 is	 a	 welcome	 development.	
Its	 ultimate	 aim	 is	 the	 stopping	 of	 the	 carnage	 that	 goes	













































Lessons	from	the	united	states	experience.	African Journal of 
American Studies,	1(1),	pp.	13–29.
10	 Akpan,	F.	(2006)	ethnic	Militancy	and	the	Nigerian	state.	Journal 





















15	 Agbai,	K.	(2008)	A	Costly	Gamble.	Insider Weekly Magazine	
(Nigeria),	28	July,	p.	21.
16	 Connors,	W.	and	swartz,	s.	(2009)	‘Nigeria’s	Amnesty	Program	























At	 just	 over	 77	 million,	 ethiopia	 is	 the	 third-most	
populous	country	in	Africa.	since	1991,	ethiopia	has	been	
implementing	 an	 ethno-linguistic	 federal	 politico-legal	
arrangement.	As	per	Articles	1	and	47	of	the	Constitution	
of	 the	 Federal	 Democratic	 republic	 of	 ethiopia,	 the	
country	is	a	federation	of	nine	ethno-linguistically	divided	
regional	states.	These	can	be	classified	into	three	groups,	
based	 on	 (i)	 their	 population	 numbers,	 as	 minority	 or	
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inhabitants)	 are	 more	 or	 less	 ethnically	 homogeneous,	
with	a	dominant	ethno-linguistic	 community	at	 regional	
level.	 Percentages	 of	 the	 population	 that	 are	 from	 their	
respective	dominant	ethno-linguistic	communities	in	these	
states	are	as	follows:	Tigray	94.98%,	Afar	91.8%,	Amhara	
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and	confers	the	right	to	“a	full	measure	of	self-government	
which	 includes	 the	 right	 to	 establish	 institutions	 of	
government	in	the	territory	that	it	inhabits”.	It	also	defines	
ethno-cultural	 communities	 as	 “Nation,	 Nationality	 or	
People…	as	a	group	of	people	who	have	or	share	a	large	
measure	of	a	common	culture	or	similar	customs,	mutual	
intelligibility	of	 language,	belief	 in	a	common	or	 related	
identities,	 a	 common	 psychological	 make-up,	 and	 who	
inhabit	an	identifiable,	predominantly	contiguous	territory”.	
The	 Federal	 Constitution	 not	 only	 recognises	 ethno-








communities	 as	 a	 group	 –	 not	 ethiopian	 nationals	 –	 are	
sovereign,	and	are	 the	building	blocks	of	 the	 federation.	
Constitutionally	 speaking,	 the	 constituent	 units	 of	 the	
ethiopian	federation	are	neither	ethiopian	nationals	nor	the	
regional	states,	but	rather	the	ethno-cultural	communities.	
A	 combined	 meaning	 of	 Articles	 9,	 39	 and	 47	 (2)	 of	 the	
Federal	Constitution	makes	this	point	very	clear.	Moreover,	






founded	 on	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 and	 capable	 of	 ensuring	
a	 lasting	 peace,	 bringing	 a	 democratic	 order	 and	
advancing	our	economic	and	social	development	can	be	
fulfilled	if	only…	individual	and	people’s	fundamental	
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an	 equal	 constitutional	 footing.	 Moreover,	 as	 stipulated	
in	Articles	5,	 8,	 39	and	47,	 “all	 sovereign	power	 resides	
in”	the	ethno-cultural	communities,	and	they	are	entitled	





heritage	 through	 self-government.	 A	 conjoined	 reading	




branch	 of	 the	 government	 to	 a	 weaker	 status	 than	 ever	
before	in	the	history	of	ethiopia.	However,	there	are	serious	
disparities	between	de jure	constitutional	power	granted	
to	 regional	 states,	 and	 the	 de facto	 power	 exercised	 by	
regional	states.6	
under	 Article	 39(4),	 the	 Federal	 Constitution	 has	
conferred	 to	 ethno-cultural	 communities	 not	 only	 the	
right	of	self-determination	but	also	the	right	to	secede	and	
establish	 an	 independent	 state	 of	 their	 own.	 Of	 course,	
















the	 Woreda	 has	 empowered	 indigenous	 people	 to	 take	














The	 Federal	 Constitution	 is	 one	 under	 which	 ethno-
cultural	 communities	 are:	 first,	 the	 ultimate	 sovereign	
entities,	 where	 constitutional	 power	 of	 both	 the	 federal	
and	regional	states	rests.	second,	they	are	constitutionally	
entitled	 to	establish	 regional	states,	or	 their	own	states,	
independent	from	ethiopia.	 In	short,	under	the	ethiopian	
federal	 system,	 ethno-linguistic	 communities	 constitute	




all	 federalist	 systems	 share	 some	 common	 broad	
characteristics	 –	 albeit	 with	 some	 varieties.11	 The	 most	









legal	 institution,	 has	 to	 reflect	 the	 political	 history	 and	





structure,	 ethno-linguistic	 composition,	 and	 most	
importantly	 the	 goals	 of	 its	 leaders.	 Political	 parties	
reflect	 the	 principal	 social	 identities	 and	 cleavages	
within	society.	In	ethiopia	the	principal	cleavage	appears	
to	be	ethno-linguistic…and	regional	[cleavages].12
Huntington	 goes	 on	 to	 argue	 that	 the	 Constitution,	
as	 a	 political	 and	 legal	 institution,	 reflects	 the	 political	





consideration	 in	 the	 ethiopia	 of	 the	 1990s,	 majoritarian	
democracy	 would	 have	 furthered	 ethno-linguistic	
THe	FeDerAL	CONsTITuTION	HAs	MANy	
sTrIKING	 FeATures,	 ONe	 OF	 WHICH	
Is	 THe	 rIGHT	 OF	 eTHNO-CuLTurAL	
COMMuNITIes	TO	seLF-DeTerMINATION,	
INCLuDING	 THe	 rIGHT	 TO	 esTABLIsH	
A	 reGIONAL	 sTATe	 Or	 INDePeNDeNT	
sTATe.	 THIs	 MAKes	 THe	 eTHIOPIAN	
CONsTITuTION	uNIQue
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domination	 and	 disintegration13,	 while	 a	 simple	 unitary	
system	 would	 have	 allowed	 the	 majority	 ethno-cultural	
group	 (in	 number	 or	 in	 power)	 to	 remain	 permanently	











Constitutionally	 speaking,	 ethiopian	 ethno-linguistic	






or	 tyranny	 from	 the	centre.	Consequently,	 the	ethiopian	

























architect	 of	 the	 Federal	 Constitution	 –	 is	 criticised	 from	
two	 opposing	 political	 positions.	 some	 characterise	 the	
ePrDF	government	as	pro-secession,	relentlessly	working	
to	disintegrate	 the	country.	Others	portray	 it	as	opposed	
to	 the	 self-determination	 aspirations	 of	 ethno-linguistic	
communities	 and	 intent	 of	 continuing	 the	 hegemonic	
domination	of	 the	central	state	 that	has	prevailed	 for	so	
long	 in	 ethiopia.	 Those	 who	 favour	 the	 former	 position	
argue	 that	 ePrDF	 is	 implementing	 the	 constitutional	
right	 of	 ethno-linguistic	 communities,	 with	 an	 ultimate	
aim	 of	 disintegrating	 ethiopia.16	 They	 believe	 they	 have	
to	 fight	 to	 abolish	 or/and	 amend	 the	 federal	 nature	 of	
the	 Federal	 Constitution.	 These	 are	 avowed	 opponents	
of	the	federal	system.	They	believe	that	ePrDF	is	sincere	
in	 implementing	 the	 Federal	 Constitution	 by	 respecting	
the	 ethno-linguistic	 federal	 arrangement,	 including	 the	







rights	 to	 self-determination	 is	 a	 sham,	and	a	 method	of	
perpetuating	the	previous	regimes	of	ethiopia.17	They	are	
of	 the	opinion	 that	 the	Federal	Constitution	 is	not	being	
implemented	fully.	They	demand	–	some	groupings	to	the	
point	of	waging	armed	struggle	–	genuine	implementation	
of	 the	 Federal	 Constitution.	 some	 ethiopian	 scholars,	
such	as	Ali	said,	even	argue	that	a	more	aggressive	fiscal	















a	 past	 political	 history	 of	 ethno-linguistic	 domination.20	
Moreover,	ethiopian	ethno-linguistic	federalism	is	designed	
to	 address	 the	 “national	 question”	 (a	 popular	 name	 for	
the	1960s	struggle	against	ethno-linguistic	domination	in	
ethiopia).21	Politicised	ethno-cultural	communities	are	not	
new	 products	 of	 ethiopian	 ethno-linguistic	 federalism.	
















along	 ethno-linguistic	 lines	 has	 been,	 and	 perhaps	
presently	 is,	easier	 in	ethiopia	 than	mobilisation	around	
overarching	countrywide	 ideals	and	principles.	But,	 it	 is	
wrong	to	assume	that	responsiveness	to	an	ethnic	slogan	
is	necessarily	anti-social	or	undemocratic.	ethno-linguistic	





At	 a	 public	 level,	 the	 political	 reaction	 to	 the	 ethno-
linguistic	 federalist	 arrangement	 in	 ethiopia	 can	 be	
summarised	 in	 three	 views:	 first,	 those	 who	 support	
ethno-linguistic	federalism	as	a	matter	of	the	human	rights	
of	 ethno-linguistic	 communities	 to	 self-determination,	




of	 thinking	 is	 similar	 to	 the	 theory	 of	 multiculturalism,	
which	 recognises	 distinct	 groups	 within	 a	 society	 and	
allows	 them	some	space	of	public	expression.23	second,	
there	are	those	who	believe	that	ethno-linguistic	federalism,	
while	 regrettable,	 is	 the	 only	 way	 to	 keep	 the	 country	
unified	and	prevent	its	disintegration.	This	is	a	calculated	
sOMe	 sCHOLArs,	 FOr	 exAMPLe	
GAMesT,	HAVe	COMMeNTeD	THAT	THe	
ADOPTION	 OF	 eTHIOPIAN	 FeDerALIsM	
WAs	 A	 “FuNDAMeNTAL	 errOr”	
BeCAuse	 IT	 Is	 BAseD	 ON	 eTHNICITy,	
AND	 WILL	 “DeePLy	 IMPrINT”	 eTHNO-
LINGuIsTIC	IDeNTITy











to	 the	 theory	of	 cultural	assimilation,	which	encourages	
the	absorption	of	minorities	into	the	dominant	culture.	It	is	
contrary	to	the	principle	of	multiculturalism.25
each	of	 these	positions	has	 legitimate	 concerns	 that	
demand	serious	consideration	–	but	not	equally.	The	third	
position	wrongly	believes	that	only	a	unitary	system	will	
ensure	 the	 unity	 of	 the	 country.	 But	 this	 position	 could	




















there	 was	 the	 option	 to	 promote	 ethiopian	 nationalism	
while	also	 recognising	and	allowing	political	expression	






and	 of	 diversity.	 It	 also	 addresses	 the	 concerns	 of	 the	
forces	of	diversity,	and	averts	 the	secession	 inclinations.	
For	 this	 reason,	 it	 is	 predictable	 that	 there	 will	 always	
be	strong	resistance	 to	any	hasty	change	of	 the	existing	
arrangement.	
Haile	 Selassie	 I	 (1892	 –	 1975),	 Emperor	 of	 Ethiopia,	
voluntarily	granted	his	people	a	constitution.
THe	 uNITArIsT	 APPrOACH	 LOOKs	
AT	 THe	 FeDerAL	 sysTeM	 As	
AN	 INsTruMeNT	 TO	 uNDO	 THe	
AssIMILATION	 eFFOrTs	 OF	 PreVIOus	
reGIMes,	 PArTICuLArLy	 THAT	 OF	



















federalism	 is	 its	 tendency	 to	 localise	 and	 or	 create	 new	
conflicts.	A	good	example	is	the	case	of	Gambella,	which	




less	 prone	 to	 inter-ethnic	 conflict	 than	 those	 without	 a	
dominant	 ethno-linguistic	 community.	 Gambella	 also	
exhibits	the	phenomenon	of	spontaneous	and	pastoralist	
migration	 (of	 the	 Nuer).	 The	 national	 identity	 of	 the	
inhabitants	 of	 its	 border	 areas	 is	 very	 fluid	 and,	 hence,	
cross-border	migration	–	of	the	pastoral	Nuer,	the	Anywaa	
refugees	 fleeing	 the	 conflict	 in	 Gambella	 to	 the	 sudan,	
and	sudanese	refugees	fleeing	to	ethiopia	due	to	the	civil	






arguments	 and	 disagreement	 about	 the	 outcome	 of	 the	
THe	NATIONAL	IDeNTITy	OF	THe	INHABITANTs	OF	ITs	BOrDer	AreAs	Is	Very	FLuID	
AND,	HeNCe,	CrOss-BOrDer	MIGrATION	–	OF	THe	PAsTOrAL	Nuer,	THe	ANyWAA	










































has	 been	 constitutionally	 ensured,	 much	 remains	 to	 be	
done	 to	 ensure	 de facto	 equality	 in	 many	 areas	 where	






communities.	 A	 reversal	 of	 the	 constitutional	 rights	 of	
ethno-linguistic	 communities,	 by	 either	 the	 central	 or	 a	
state	government,	would	be	politically	costly.	Any	attempt	
at	discrimination	among	ethno-cultural	 communities,	or	





Other	 constraints,	 discussed	 above,	 are	 attributable	
to	 the	 immaturity	 of	 the	 federal	 system.	 The	 major	
problems	can	best	be	described	as	ones	of	implementation,	




of	 four	 ethnic-based	 parties	 that	 control	 almost	 all	 the	
regional	 states,	 it	 exercises	 effective	 control	 over	 the	
federation	 through	 its	 member	 and	 affiliated	 political	
parties	 in	 the	 regions.	This	party	chain	of	command	has	
effectively	replaced	state	control.	Almost	all	decisions	of	
the	party	are	made	and	implemented	using	party	structures,	
instead	 of	 the	 state	 structure.	 Procedurally,	 this	 system	









its	 organisational	 culture	 of	 democratic	 centralism	 and	
centralised	party	structure,	weakened	the	federal	system	
and	regional	state	structures.	The	political	constitution	of	
ePrDF	 effectively	 antagonises	 the	 federal	 system	 it	 has	
built.	 In	 short,	 democratic	 centralism	 is	 an	 antithesis	 of	
federalism.	For	instance,	regional	state	presidents	are	more	
accountable	to	the	party	than	to	their	election	constituents	




Thus	 another	 key	 binding	 constraint	 to	 an	 effective	
federalism	in	ethiopia	is	the	ruling	party’s	excessive	control	
of	 regional	 party	 leaders	 and	 the	 central	 government	








state	 officials	 to	 implement	 the	 Federal	 Constitution	
properly.	 One	 way	 in	 which	 the	 leading	 difficulties	 in	








BeLGIuM	 AND	 CANADA	 Are	 GOOD	
exAMPLes	OF	THIs	POINT
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would	facilitate	the	building	of	a	human	rights-protective	
federalism.	striking	a	balance	between	the	forces	of	unity	
and	diversity,	between	 regional	 state	power	and	 federal	
power	 requires	 the	 educating	 and	 training	 of	 officials,	
academics	and	public	servants	at	both	the	centre	and	in	the	
regional	states.	





commitments.	 In	 this	 regard,	 a	 deliberate	 policy	 of	
promoting	consensus	and	unity	in	diversity	around	positive	
historic	 legacies	 has	 to	 be	 designed	 and	 implemented.	
The	 victory	 of	 Adwa,	 ethiopia’s	 tolerance	 and	 long	
acceptance	 of	 all	 major	 religions,	 etc.	 could	 serve	 as	
unifying	historical	symbols	for	ethiopia.	While	addressing	
historical	grievances	due	to	previous	exclusionist	regimes	
and	 rejecting	any	new	political	 tendencies	 to	bring	back	
the	 old	 regimes	 of	 discrimination	 and	 exclusion,	 much	
has	 to	 be	 done	 in	 championing	 commonly	 appreciated	








of	 improvement.28	 The	 introduction	 of	 civic	 education,	
democratic	patriotism,	 the	 celebration	of	 the	Day	of	 the	
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The	 end	 of	 the	 civil	 war	 in	 Liberia	 in	 2003,	 and	 the	
subsequent	 free	 and	 fair	 democratic	 elections	 of	 2005,	
signalled	the	emergence	of	peace,	stability	and	sustainable	
development	 to	 the	 country.	 reaping	 benefits	 from	
the	 cessation	 of	 hostilities	 and	 the	 ensuing	 democratic	
environment,	 Liberians	 needed	 to	 make	 necessary	
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from	 the	 2003	 Peace	 Accord.	 The	 National	 Transitional	




regime	 assumed	 power	 in	 2006,	 and	 continued	 the	
collaboration	 with	 the	 uN	 Mission	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	
country’s	reform	peace	agenda	was	implemented.
Paramount	 among	 the	 reform	 recommendations	
was	 security	 sector	 reform	 (ssr).	 This	 issue	 sparked	
major	 debate	 amongst	 the	 country’s	 actors.	 Warring	
factions	wanted	to	feature	their	generals	in	the	reformed	
(new)	 army,	 while	 civil	 society	 activists	 and	 political	
parties	 argued	 against	 the	 recruitment	 of	 “rebels”	 into	
the	 military.	 The	 outcome	 was	 an	 agreement	 that	 the	
new	army	would	accommodate	members	of	all	warring	
factions	in	its	ranks,	including	the	moribund	Armed	Forces	
of	 Liberia	 (AFL)	 and	 forces	 loyal	 to	 the	 government	 of	
Charles	 Taylor1	 at	 the	 time	 of	 the	 signing	 of	 the	 peace	
agreement.	 The	 reform	 programme	 was	 ongoing	 until	
31	December	2009,	when	 the	united	states	 turned	over	




the	 challenges	 faced	 by	 the	 stakeholders	 in	 ensuring	





development	 discourses	 in	 1998,	 in	 a	 speech	 delivered	
by	 the	 ministerial	 head	 of	 the	 British	 Department	 for	
International	 Development	 (DfID),	 Clare	 short.	 Issues	
concerning	the	building	of	democratic	security	institutions	
and	 the	 need	 for	 a	 viable	 and	 comprehensive	 security	




then,	 it	 has	 been	 applied	 to	 countries	 emerging	 from	
wars,	 and	 nations	 that	 are	 either	 failing	 or	 weak	 and	
fragile.	 specifically,	 development	 donors	 have	 argued	
that	assistance	must	flow	into	secured	environments	and,	





The	 concept	 of	 ssr	 is	 now	 widely	 accepted	 and	
popularly	 used,	 even	 though	 there	 were	 proposals	 of	
different	 phrases	 to	 represent	 the	 concept	 when	 it	 was	
introduced	to	the	development	debate.	These	proposals	
included	 that	 of	 the	 Bureau	 of	 Crisis	 Prevention	 and	








SSR	 is	a	concept	 that	was	 introduced	 in	 international	
development	discourses	 in	1998	 in	a	speech	delivered	
by	 the	ministerial	 head	of	 the	British	Department	 for	
International	Development	(DfID),	Clare	Short.
THe	 OuTCOMe	 WAs	 AN	 AGreeMeNT	
THAT	 THe	 NeW	 ArMy	 WOuLD	
ACCOMMODATe	 MeMBers	 OF	 ALL	
WArrING	 FACTIONs	 IN	 ITs	 rANKs,	
INCLuDING	 THe	 MOrIBuND	 ArMeD	
FOrCes	OF	LIBerIA	 (AFL)	AND	FOrCes	
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the	state.	This	process	has	 to	do	with	 the	 restructuring	
and	 empowering	 of	 security-related	 institutions	 for	
effectiveness,	 discipline	 and	 capacity-building	 for	









the	 violence	 subsides	 and	 peacebuilding	 programmes	














war	 (1989–2003),	 Liberia’s	 security	 institutions	 were	





of	 the	 people.	 They	 became	 unpopular	 for	 their	 lack	
of	 professionalism,	 corruption,	 frequent	 human	 rights	
violations	and	their	exploitation	by	their	political	patrons	
to	 intimidate	 –	 and,	 at	 times,	 terrorise	 –	 the	 people.	 In	
1980,	 the	military	 seized	power	 in	Liberia	and,	 in	1985,	
transformed	itself	into	a	civilian	government.	From	1980	
onwards,	Liberia’s	security	forces	were	part	of	the	political	
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peaceful	 environment,	 both	 domestically	 and	 in	 the	
sub-region,	 that	 is	 conducive	 to	 sustainable,	 inclusive,	
and	equitable	growth	and	development”.4	In	the	Poverty	
reduction	 strategy	 of	 Liberia	 (Prs)	 of	 2008-2011,	 the	
government	 articulated	 issues	 of	 peace	 and	 security	
as	a	 first	priority,	without	which	 there	could	be	no	 real	
development	in	the	country.	The	first	pillar	of	the	Prs	was	
therefore	“consolidating	peace	and	security”.	
Liberia’s	 ssr	 programme	 is	 legally	 empowered	 by	
three	enabling,	but	complicated,	 instruments.	These	are	
the	Comprehensive	Peace	Accord	of	2003,	the	Constitution	
of	 Liberia,	 and	 the	 united	 Nations	 security	 Council	
resolution	1509	of	2003.	
The	Comprehensive	Peace	Accord	(CPA)
The	 CPA	 was	 signed	 in	 2003	 in	 Accra,	 and	 set	 the	
platform	 for	 the	 end	 of	 the	 war.	 It	 provided	 for	 several	




NTGL	 of	 2003-05,	 since	 certain	 provisions	 of	 the	 1986	
Constitution	of	Liberia	were	suspended	to	accommodate	
the	compromises	and	 reforms	needed	 for	 the	country’s	
stability	 and	 recovery.	 Part	 four	 of	 the	 CPA	 –	 security	
sector	 reform	 –	 first	 called	 for	 the	 disbandment	 of	 all	
irregular	forces	in	the	republic	of	Liberia,	to	set	the	stage	
for	total	reform	in	the	security	sector.	The	real	process	of	
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LOsING	 THeIr	 NeuTrALITy	 AND	 reLeVANCe	 As	 eNFOrCers	 OF	 THe	 LAW	 AND	
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CPA	 laid	 special	 emphasis	 on	 democratic	 controls	 and	
values,	and	the	respect	of	human	rights	by	these	forces,	
stating:
There	 shall	 be	 an	 immediate	 restructuring	 of	 the	
National	Police	Force,	the	Immigration	Force,	special	
security	 service	 (sss),	 custom	 security	 guards	 and	
such	other	statutory	security	units.	These	restructured	
security	forces	shall	adopt	a	professional	orientation	
that	 emphasizes	 democratic	 values	 and	 respect	 for	
human	rights,	a	non-partisan	approach	to	duty	and	the	
avoidance	of	corrupt	practices.6


















upon	 the	 election	 and	 subsequent	 inauguration	 of	
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United Nations Security Council Resolution 1509
uN	 security	 Council	 resolution	 1509	 of	 september	
2003	provided	a	legal	framework	for	the	ssr	programme	
in	Liberia.	 It	mandated	uNMIL	 to	assist	 the	 transitional	
government	 in	 monitoring	 and	 restructuring	 the	 police	
and	 military	 forces,	 with	 an	 emphasis	 on	 democratic	
values.	 The	 security	 Council	 also	 mandated	 uNMIL	 to	






police,	 in	 cooperation	 with	 eCOWAs,	 international	
organizations,	and	interested	state”.	
For	 the	 AFL,	 it	 mandated	 uNMIL	 “to	 assist	 the	






Liberians	 into	 the	police	and	military	 forces,	 as	well	 as	
such	paramilitary	groups	as	immigration	and	correctional	
services.	 restructuring	 of	 the	 Liberian	 National	 Police	
(LNP)	 began	 in	 2004,	 with	 the	 help	 of	 the	 uNMIL.	 This	
reform	has	gone	beyond	a	mere	 recruitment	of	officers	
to	 a	 process	 of	 institutional	 capacity-building,	 with	
reforms	in	the	rank	and	file	of	the	police	service.	Monthly	
salaries	 for	 the	 lowest	 rankings	 in	 the	police	have	been	
increased	 over	 100%	 during	 the	 last	 four	 years.	 In	 the	
areas	of	 infrastructure	and	 institutional	 reform,	 the	LNP	
has	undergone	considerable	 restructuring.	The	position	
of	 police	 director	 has	 now	 been	 changed	 to	 inspector	
general,	and	the	Criminal	Investigation	Department	(CID)	is	
now	called	the	Crime	service	Department.	These	changes	
in	 names	 are	 intended	 to	 reflect	 the	 modified	 missions	
and	purposes	of	the	positions	and	departments	within	the	
police.	 For	 example,	 a	 Women	 and	 Children	 Protection	
section	has	been	created	within	the	LNP	as	a	first	line	of	
response	regarding	women’s	and	children’s	issues.
Other	 institutional	 rebuilding	 initiatives	 that	 have	
taken	place	include	the	development	of	a	LNP	duty	manual	
and	the	establishment	of	a	Police	Promotion	Board,	and	









With	 regard	 to	 the	 military,	 the	 AFL	 is	 currently	 the	
main	spotlight	of	the	country’s	ssr	programme.	Liberians	
fear	 the	 military,	 due	 to	 its	 brutal	 roles	 in	 the	 civil	 war	
and	 its	 general	 violence,	 indiscipline	 and	 human	 rights	
abuses.	reforming	the	AFL	is	popular	with	the	people	of	
Liberia,	and	the	process	has	 involved	individual	citizens	
and	civil	 society	organisations	 –	 citizens	have	 the	 right	
to	challenge	and	vet	new	applicants	to	the	army.	During	
the	 recruitment	 process,	 photographs	 of	 applicants	 are	
displayed	in	community	centres	for	citizens	to	review	and	
to	object,	should	candidates	have	a	record	of	indiscipline,	
crime	 and	 human	 rights	 abuses.	 Besides	 this	 process,	
background	 investigations	 are	 conducted	 on	 individual	

















support	 to	 the	 new	 army,	 and	 four	 barracks	 have	 been	
refurbished	 and	 made	 fully	 operational.11	 The	 Liberian	
Coast	 Guard	 unit	 of	 the	 AFL	 has	 also	 trained	 about	
DurING	 THe	 reCruITMeNT	 PrOCess,	
PHOTOGrAPHs	 OF	 APPLICANTs	 Are	
DIsPLAyeD	 IN	 COMMuNITy	 CeNTres	
FOr	 CITIZeNs	 TO	 reVIeW	 AND	 TO	
OBJeCT,	 sHOuLD	 CANDIDATes	 HAVe	
A	 reCOrD	 OF	 INDIsCIPLINe,	 CrIMe	
AND	 HuMAN	 rIGHTs	 ABuses.	
BesIDes	THIs	PrOCess,	BACKGrOuND	
INVesTIGATIONs	 Are	 CONDuCTeD	
ON	 INDIVIDuAL	 APPLICANTs	 IN	 THeIr	
COMMuNITIes	AND	sCHOOLs





40	 officers,	 and	 this	 unit	 has	 a	 mandate	 of	 improving	
coastline	management,	controlling	smuggling	and	illegal	
fishing.	 There	 is	 also	 a	 new	 bureau	 for	 the	 welfare	 of	
retired	 AFL	 servicemen,	 called	 the	 Bureau	 of	 Veteran	
Affairs.	
Other	 security	 institutions	 have	 also	 been	 reformed	
and	 reactivated,	 including	 the	 Bureau	 of	 Immigration,	
Bureau	 of	 Correction	 and	 the	 National	 Fire	 service.	 A	
general	review	process	of	all	of	 the	security	 institutions	





conflict	governance	 reform	 initiatives,	 is	 faced	with	 the	
perennial	challenges	of	inadequate	resources	and	limited	
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The	 country	 is	 also	 still	 struggling	 to	 deal	 with	 the	
ex-servicemen	 of	 the	 AFL,	 who	 have	 staged	 numerous	
strikes	for	benefits	and	re-enlistment	into	the	new	military.	
some	 of	 the	 demobilised	 soldiers	 still	 allege	 that	 they	
are	 in	 the	 army,	 claiming	 that	 the	 CPA	 called	 for	 the	
restructuring	 of	 the	 AFL,	 and	 not	 its	 disbandment.	 The	









Liberia’s	 current	 security	 system	 is	 a	 considerable	
improvement	 over	 the	 pre-war	 untrained	 and	 highly	
politicised	 security	 institutions	 that	 were	 used	 to	
intimidate	citizens	and	maximise	the	power	of	the	security	
forces.	 significant	 gains	 have	 been	 made	 through	 the	
training	 and/or	 retraining	 of	 officers	 for	 the	 AFL,	 LNP,	
Immigration,	Correction	and	other	security	institutions.	As	
the	training	of	security	institution	personnel	–	particularly	




it	 over	 to	 the	 Liberian	 government.	 It	 is	 now	 time	 for	
the	country	to	protect	its	citizens	by	maintaining	trained	
and	 equipped	 security	 institutions.	 The	 need	 to	 train	
and	 deploy	 more	 police	 officers	 around	 the	 country	 is	
critical	to	sustaining	the	integrity	of	the	ssr	programme	
and	 promoting	 internal	 security.	 The	 need	 to	 open	
educational	 and	 training	opportunities	 for	personnel	of	
the	security	institutions	to	advance	themselves	cannot	be	
overemphasised,	since	 there	 is	a	yearning	 for	a	 literate	
security	regime	with	civic	and	democratic	values.	equally	
important	 to	 the	 process	 is	 the	 need	 to	 improve	 the	
salaries	and	benefits	of	servicemen	and	women	in	security	













2		 Brzoska,	Michael	(2003)	Development Donors and the Concept 
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THe	 COuNTry	 Is	 ALsO	 sTILL	
sTruGGLING	 TO	 DeAL	 WITH	 THe	
ex-serVICeMeN	 OF	 THe	 AFL,	 WHO	
HAVe	 sTAGeD	 NuMerOus	 sTrIKes	
FOr	 BeNeFITs	 AND	 re-eNLIsTMeNT	
INTO	 THe	 NeW	 MILITAry.	 sOMe	 OF	











except	 prejudgments	 and	 superficialities?	 How	 truly	
informed	are	we	about	conflicts	in	Central	Africa?
In	 this	 book,	 Marie-soleil	 Frère	 synthesises	 the	
interaction	 between	 the	 mass	 media	 and	 conflict	 in	
Burundi,	 the	 Democratic	 republic	 of	 Congo	 (DrC),	
rwanda,	Congo-Brazzaville,	the	Central	African	republic,	
Chad,	 Cameroon,	 Gabon	 and	 equatorial 	 Guinea.	
A	 professor	 of	 journalism	 specialising	 in	 Francophone	




media	 influence	 during	 conflicts,	 and	 its	 social	 role	 in	
post-conflict	scenarios	and	peace	processes.
The	book’s	objective	is	to	improve	our	understanding	
of	 the	 dynamics	 of	 the	 media	 in	 those	 states,	 and	 to	
identify	 strategies	 that	 can	contribute	 to	 strengthening	
or	 weakening	 them	 since,	 she	 argues,	 the	 aim	 of	
documentation	and	reflection	is	to	prepare	us	for	action	
(p.	2).
Frère	 does	 not	 just	 supply	 theoretical	 analyses,	 or	
isolated	and	unproven	empirical	considerations.	Instead,	
she	 allows	 the	 reader	 to	 understand	 what	 could	 be	
claimed	to	be	some	basics	–	that	Africa	is	not	a	country,	
but	a	continent,	and	that	central	Africa	has	no	historical	
or	 political	 institutional	 unity,	 but	 distinct	 histories,	
populations,	political	and	economic	situations.	We	could	
even	 ask:	 why	 central	 Africa?	 The	 overwhelming	 and	
urgent	 need	 to	 have	 realistic,	 mature	 and	 pedagogical	
bibliographical	 resources	 on	 this	 complex	 part	 of	 the	
world	 would	 be	 the	 first	 answer.	 The	 second	 and	 third	
answers	 are	 provided	 by	 the	 author:	 because	 central	
Africa	“is	an	area	where	these	media	dynamics	can	best	
be	observed”	 (p.	1),	and	“it	 is	also	one	of	 the	principal	
focus	 points,	 practically	 a	 laboratory,	 for	 regional	 and	
international	nongovernmental	organizations”	(p.	2).
The	 book’s	 analysis	 is	 based	 mainly	 on	 the	 years	
1993–2004.	 From	 state	 monopoly	 policies	 to	 privately-
owned	 newspapers,	 radio	 and	 television,	 factors	 such	
as	 the	 “internal	 organization	 of	 the	 media	 companies,	
the	relationship	among	journalists	and	political	players,	
and	 the	 structure	 of	 the	 media	 environment,	 including	
professional	solidarity”	(p.	5)	are	stressed,	in	an	attempt	
to	 understand	 how	 the	 media	 positions	 itself	 in	 times	
of	 conflict.	 each	 of	 the	 nine	 national	 case	 studies	 is	
introduced	by	a	geographical	and	chronological	résumé.	
The	 role	 of	 new	 digital	 media	 -	 such	 as	 weblogs,	
micro-blogs,	 podcasts,	 videocasts	 and	 online	 social	
networks	-,	powered	from	exile	and	the	diaspora,	should	
also	be	considered	in	a	future	edition	.





function	 of	 public	 and	 private	 media,	 the	 international	
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and	cultural	studies.	 If	we	were	asked	what	 the	most	 important	 feature	 is	 that	 is	being	
deeply	and	permanently	altered	by	 the	 impact	of	digital	media	–	an	action,	a	process,	

























and	provincial	elections	entitled	Zunami! The 2009 South African Election.
